Love is the moment of the two in unison

Play gives the soul its form—the body whose moments animate the sublimely true. Without this form, there might not be a soul; or at the very least, the soul would be lost upon us in life. It would crush against the world, passing before us as nothing more than a shocking spark, inexpressible. The matter of life and the matter of living recede from one another at one moment and collide again in the next. Living happens when the soul, essence, and truth of those colored coverings is discovered in ever-higher degrees of approximation to the spirit—its most powerful actualization is in love. Rather than in love, living is defined by love. The soul of love, falling everywhere like hapless leaves into water, sinks below the surface with the thousand husks of summer if one forgets its supporting body. Love is that eternal breath and illumination that cannot but be both wind and leaf—the object and its path. One cannot begin with the hollow and move subtly to its shaping parts, however silent and transparent they might be, and hope to glean an understanding. Love is the moment of the two in unison, the moment of unity in disjunction. And this love conferred upon disjunction includes many shades of longing, sorrow, and aching, each with its own formal elaboration of the infinite. It is that eternal stuff that enlivens the present and highlights the nearness of infinity. It does not care for understanding, only truth. But such nearness of this infinite soul also threatens life. The thing that feeds can over-fill; the heart and passion of life tempts the sundried embers toward a house fire like a dry, cold wind. It teases the empty onlooker into believing that there is a third position of knowledge. The onlooker is not a third position, but an imaginary stance that denies truth in exchange for practicality.

 

The empirically aesthetic fiction of politics

so  many more things can go wrong on a computer than on a type-writer. and yet the typewriter has me stumped. The ribbon is twisted. It’s making me completely angry… not at the typewriter. It’s a different kind of technical problem. I think if I tried to survey all of the different kinds of “technical problems”, or the estrangement that I have with italicizing something, it makes me very uneasy.

I didn’t realize it until a little while ago. Here I am, staring out my window, but I’m writing, with as much confidence and fluidity as if I were laboring over the lines. And if I make an error, something will highlight it for me. If I need to imprint the words or shift a letter, all I have to do is push a button. It’s not about the typewriter, either. That is just the thing that came before this… they are made of the same sentiments. What I feel, though, is the separation of my thoughts and their production. Is this real? Cloud data somewhere, and as long as we have this, it will be around well after my youngest sister has her last grandchild. Of what I made in a cloud, it will be seen in the numbers that make the image of the cloud, and the final product is a virtual list, fluidity, production.

I was talking last night with some friends. One said that he feels pure theory is self-indulgent crap, and that there has to be some empirical use for it. I had a hard time understanding his comment. Of course, I see that theory can be self-indulgent, like that presenter at Cornell a few months ago who said that his theory only worked in theory. (He was talking about some post neo anti fascist babble about the blood and the earth relating to the Hobbsean myth of humanity. For this I can submit Marx’s sixth thesis on Feuerbach.) But his own argument seemed to preclude itself from theory, full stop. If something only works in theory, it seems to me that it is a mere fiction. And that something is a fiction, it must be understood both empirically and theoretically. Which leads me to my second critique of my friend’s statement, that the aesthetic may or may not really be an empirical use of theory. But theory is not to be used empirically. At least, not in any pedestrian sort of way. Like the man who said that his theory works only in theory, I would say to him that he was writing fiction, and that it would best be left to the theorists to make sense of his fiction. And to determine that his fiction was in fact a fiction and not a theory, one must inhabit the uses and abuses of imagined theories and sorts of other fictions from the empirically theoretical, and not the theoretically empirical, which is always a fiction.

And so it seems that theory is not a theory unless it is used in such a way that allows us to see the “empirical” (which is a fiction, as well, for various reasons, not the least of which is the very need to “find” the empirical).

I wonder, though, about the uses of a theoretical standpoint in the empirical production of aesthetics (forgive me if I start to sound cute). In the last day of the Idealist Tradition, we were having a stupid man’s discussion of the intersection between aesthetics and ethics. I should say that my understanding of the whole thing is a little stupid, but all in all, I think that the class was useful, even if only negatively. Okay, so we were ending the Idealist Tradition on a bit of sour note with Nietzsche. I really do need to spend time finding out just why I hate him so much…

The Idealist tradition “dies” but for me, it only dies insofar as it is ignored. I can’t go much deeper into my analysis of N right now, aside from the fact that he can neither be an anarchist nor a fascist. His fascism is impossible because it demands a rejection of all structure, and he cannot function as an anarchist because his anarchism depends upon the hierarchical construction of a united society. So, forgive all of my childish antics and my trite tone and lack of style when I say that Nietzsche seems to me like the crystallization of modern hysteria. This idea is malformed though, and I’m sure that someone has already written on it.

Here, I’m pulling myself back in to the discussion of the aesthetic and the ethical. I do see that the Fascists could have been great modern artists, insofar as they have precluded themselves from the real implications of being a fascist. In short, they were never really fascists, and if they were fascists in the way that people love to categorize them as Nietzschians, they were just scaley-eyed followers from the get-go. They did not know or posses the theoretical knowledge of their own aesthetic kernel. They might as well have made boots in Berlin.

I don’t know if I’m saying what I mean to say, and that’s because I am really undecided about the matter. No, I am not saying that Nolde was not Nolde, rather that he did not posses the means, empirically, that made him great. In a sense, i do understand that the aesthetic seems to be subsumed in the political, since it best operates (on an empirically functional level) when the actant is not aware of his situation. At best, he is only partially aware. In literature, I am thinking of Flaubert.

So, if aesthetics are not the mediatory device, and are instead understood as the kernel within the political, at the very worst, as something half dismantled from the political, what can I have to say about the production of art?

The way we move beyond both the “aesthetic” and “the political” to the first degree, is t borrow Fredric Jameson’s mathematical metaphor and kick it to the next power: we enter the realm of theory to deal with the empirical realities of imagined theories and politics.

From the merely aesthetic, just as the merely political, it is impossible to see which one is the empirical application of what, and at what time. It is also impossible to see the break between artistic greatness and technical skill, whose inspiration lies elsewhere. Theory, then, is the positing of these competing “first valence” phenomena, and placing them against not only themselves but against history and their contingent places in “empirical” reality. If you would like to call the theoretical a vacant category of metaphysics, you’ve got to be kidding yourself.

For an entry on the proper designation of theory and its production as “aesthetic,” I might need to eat some lunch, first.

tidbit of thesis

Love, then, is no particularly of this movement, but is embedded in the totality of it: the disjunction of the two does not make the third position of the child, but reconfirms unity through the evocation and production between the disjunction. This familial logic might easily fall into pitfalls of various derivative symbolic readings (i.e. as a real correspondence to the family, or to gendered discourses, or to physiological reproduction, in general, of which there is no way out except by a given identity politic, hence re-instating the logic of the one). Love’s unity, disjunction, and unity from the disjunction is the dialectic, itself. Hegel says “Thus the process is: unity, separated opposites, reunion” (Hegel 33). Love is the process by which oppositions are nullified through synthesis towards a genuine unity, where “equality” itself is dismantled as a categorical imperative, because sameness of difference has been erased through the process of legitimate production.

Some Saturday- excuse my inadequate formatting…

I felt like making something today. (We were having meetings on layout and it got me all figety.)

This was part of a box that some of my books came in.

(from bottom left clockwise): beer neck, reverse silhouette film, f.a. snippet, dime glued over word confetti, mixed papers

from single essay in september 2009 issue of foreign affairs, reconstituted: Hegel the world's owl come as the impractical history of future. Or is it the flight path, to Minerva, encountering either optical illusions or 'world court,'

Continuation: we might be its current ally across structural problems, including Francis Fukuyama

(from bottom left clockwise): illumination on film, print, reverse silhouette framing forgotten street in Savannah, GA, f.a. tidbit, rainbow bright socks and rock style guide from rolling stones feb. 2008

beer, India's Fortune, Domino's doorknob insert.